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moral faith on the one hand and a defence of the Christian religion as the best path to
reach the vocation of the human species on the other. According to Kant, the Christian
churches are historically indispensable in the evolution of the moral predispositions and
religious convictions of the human species, and in the process of cultivating a critically
disciplined moral religion. This essay highlights the tension between a rational under-
standing of moral faith and an embedded approach that winds up with an apology of
Christianity.
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1. Introduction
“Once human nature has attained to its full destiny and highest possible perfec-
tion, that will be the kingdom of God on earth, and inner conscience, justice and
equity will then hold sway, rather than the power of authority” (Collins 27, p. 471).
In recent years, numerous and excellent interpretations of Kantos cosmopoli-
tanism have been published. Many focus on his legal cosmopolitanism, especially
on cosmopolitan right; others deal with his moral cosmopolitanism, especially the
idea of an ethical or moral commonwealth (for introductions see Kleingeld 2012
and Cavallar 2015). To my knowledge, no publication has so far dealt with what I
call Kantos religious cosmopolitanism. The quote from theCollins lecture with the
emphasis on the destiny or vocation of the species, its possible perfection, on inner
conscience and “the kingdom of God on earth” highlights this usually neglected
type of cosmopolitanism, perhaps typical of many Enlightenment thinkers (see
Louden 2007, pp. 15–25). The present essay tries to fill this gap in Kant scholar-
ship. I will argue that Kantos cosmopolitanism is Janus-faced: it oscillates between
a dynamic understanding of religious progress in world history focusing on a
rational understanding of moral faith on the one hand and a defence of the
Christian religion as the best path to reach the vocation of the human species on
the other. According to Kant, the Christian churches are historically indis-
pensable in the evolution of themoral predispositions and religious convictions of
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the human species, and in the process of cultivating a critically disciplined moral
religion. This tension between a rational understanding of moral faith and an
embedded approach that winds up with an apology of Christianity is highlighted
in this essay.
Cosmopolitanism is the belief or the theory that all humans, regardless of race,
gender, historical faith or political affiliation belong to, or should belong to, one
single community, and that this global community should be enhanced and pro-
moted. Kant claims that humans reach their cosmopolitan vocation (Bes-
timmung) if they cultivate their dispositions, especially (but not only) their moral
one, and promote the highest good, the combination of virtue and happiness. Kant
makes the following distinctions (this follows Langthaler 2014: II, pp. 93–147 and
Cavallar 2015, pp. 21–48):
1. The highest good in the writings on politics and history is the highest political
good, namely a global juridical condition (Rechtszustand) which approximates
world peace (cf. MM 6, p. 354 f.).
2. The establishment of a global ethical community is the “highest moral (sit-
tliche) good” (Religion 6, p. 97). This is Kantos moral cosmopolitanism. Kant
calls the duty to promote this highest good as a member of the cosmopolitan
moral community or “union […] of well-disposed human beings” (Religion 6,
p. 98) a duty “sui generis […] of the human race toward itself”, since the highest
good is a good “common to all” (ibid., p. 97).
3. The highest good proper coincides with the transcendent kingdom ofGod, the
“supersensible (intelligible) world” (Theodicy 8, p. 264) or the “Kingdom of
Heaven” (Religion 6, p. 134; cf. End 8, pp. 328–330). As Kant puts it in The
Conflict of Faculties, “the human being must be destined for two entirely
different worlds: for the realm of sense and understanding and so for this
terrestrial world, but also for another world, which we do not know – a moral
realm” (Conflict 7, p. 70; cf. 28 p. 301). This is Kantos religious cosmopoli-
tanism.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant distinguishes between the “highest
original good”, that is, Godos existence, and the “highest derived good (the best
world)” (KpV 5, p. 125). Kantos argument throughout his works is that our honest
attempts to promote the latter, which coincides with no. 2 or the “highest moral
good”, leads to the moral interest in the presupposition of no. 3, the highest good
proper, which implies Godos existence. The transition from no. 2 to no. 3 is the
point of contention among Kant scholars and one focus of this essay (see the
analysis below).
I argue that Kant develops in the Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason (1793) a form of religious cosmopolitanism that claims to be rooted in the
Christian tradition, interpreted according to the standards of Kantos own moral
religion. Religious cosmopolitanism is the view that believers of different faiths,
denominations or religious communities are members, or should be members, of
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one single community. Kantian religious cosmopolitanism is the view that all
human beings who have developed a moral disposition, implicitly or explicitly
understand their envisioned good life-conduct as authentic religious service and
have ordained their moral disposition to the ethical commonwealth, aremembers
of a single community of believers. What Kant calls philosophical chiliasm – the
idea of a legal community encompassing the whole world at the end of history – is
complemented by theological chiliasm – the idea of a global moral common-
wealth beyond history. Philosophical chiliasm is political and includes the highest
political good, namely perpetual peace and aworld-republic; theological chiliasm
“awaits for the completed moral improvement of the human race” (Religion 6, p.
34). Agents who cultivate their moral disposition and aim at virtue consider
themselves “the chosen citizens of a divine (ethical) state” (Religion 6, p. 136). For
Kant, this concept is cosmopolitan in the sense that it is based on morality un-
derstood as a universal, a priori capacity of rational agents, and that any human
being is capable of understanding and following themoral law. Consequently, any
human who strives for moral perfection is a prospective member of this divine
state, provided that they develop a moral faith that is the rational consequence of
an impartial analysis of the human condition of finite beings with a moral dis-
position.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 tries to reconstruct Kantos reli-
gious cosmopolitanism. My approach differs from standard interpretations by
emphasising the personal dimension of Kantos moral theism. Kantos religious
cosmopolitanism revolves around the idea of a transcendent “unconditioned to-
tality” (KpV 5, p. 108), with humans being obliged to promote this totality (which
coincides with the highest good proper) by forming visible churches, combating
the social consequences of radical evil, cultivating their moral predispositions
(Anlagen) and thus approaching the idea of a cosmopolitan “invisible church”.
The main reason why moral education should be complemented by religious
formation is personal in the sense that the whole of oneos life is at stake, oneos self-
understanding and oneos “life-conduct”. Religious formation aims at fighting off
moral despair and sorrow (melancholy, Kummer) and intends to boost our will-
ingness to steadfastly pursue the highest good as the goal of our moral volition.
This personal understanding is also the background of the idea of a Kingdom of
heaven or God or the “church invisible”, destined to encompass “the entire
human race”, since “the concept of an ethical community always refers to the
ideal of a totality of human beings” (Religion 6, p. 96).
Section 3 claims that Kantos religious cosmopolitanism is dynamic. Kantos
teleological and reflective interpretation of history and his sketch of the history of
the church (Kirchengeschichte) outline a development from the moral predis-
position (Anlage) in humans to the triumph of the invisible church. Manifest
religious practice startedwith an aberration, namely, with paganism. The vocation
of the human species is to conceptualize, establish and cultivate pure religion or
moral faith. In Kantos narrative of the history of the church, Judaism is the neg-
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ative foil to make Christianity shine. One of the latteros distinct advantages over
the Jewish faith is its cosmopolitan nature, namely the attempt to found a uni-
versal church. Kant distinguished sharply between the teachings of Christ ac-
cording to the New Testament on the one hand and what later generations of
theologians and church leadersmade out of them.The process of reform reaches a
climax in the Age of Enlightenment.
In Section 4, I argue that Kant deliberately went beyond the idea of rational or
natural religion widespread in the Enlightenment. I am going to discuss two
related Kantian claims. The first one is that religious cosmopolitanism (as de-
veloped in the previous section) has to be embedded, that is, has to be rooted in
and take as its starting point an ecclesiastical faith with its statutory laws. I argue
that this claim is plausible. Kantos second claim is that only the Christian churches
can offer this starting point. I do not find all his arguments convincing. Kant holds
that the biblical stories are “valid and binding practically, for the whole world and
at all times” so that anyone “can recognize his duty in it” (Religion 6, p. 83).
However,Kant reaches this cosmopolitan conclusion only after he has interpreted
these stories according to his hermeneutical approach.
2. Kantbs Religious Cosmopolitanism
When at the end of theLectures on pedagogy, Kant reflects on religious education
or formation (Bildung), he asserts that “onemust not begin with theology” (LP 9,
p. 494). Moral formation that started with theological concepts would in all
likelihood foster heteronomy, with fear of Godos anger and attempts to get divine
rewards as themain incentives. The educational advice is based onKantos doctrine
that “on its own behalf morality in no way needs religion” (Religion 6, p. 3),
because of the autonomy of practical reason. In the same lectures, Kant also holds
that “to all morality there belongs religion” (LP 9, p. 494). This mirrors his phi-
losophy of religion and the central claim that morality “inevitably leads to reli-
gion” (Religion 6, p. 6), a claim that has been the focus of philosophical con-
troversy up to the present.
Kantos argument in favour of religious formation as complementing moral
education can be reconstructed in the following way. Kant came to realise that in
order to steadfastly commit oneself to a moral life and to cultivate virtue, certain
religious beliefs – such as the viability of the ethical commonwealth – and sym-
bolic representation were required. The core of the argument is that the uncon-
ditional moral law sets the moral agent in opposition to nature and the world as it
is, and thus exposes her to the possibility of moral despair. This in turn threatens
the cultivation of a moral character, the willingness to promote the realization of
the highest good, and the commitment to a moral life in general. It was Kantos
claim that proper moral education turns the student to the inner core of her own
reason, and that, since all humanbeings share identical rational structures a priori,
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this in turn leads to the idea of universality and thus to the idea of juridical, moral
and religious cosmopolitanism.
Moral education should be complemented by religious formation since the
latter aims at fighting off moral despair, once the moral agent has become aware
of the split between theworld as it ought to be andworld as it is, andher realization
that fulfilling themoral commandmay result in undermining oneos own pursuit of
happiness in the world. In itself, this does not undermine the possibility of moral
endeavours, but it undermines its likelihood. Kant claims that in order for the
moral law to be binding on us, we have to be sure that the highest good and the
moral world are at least possible (from the point of view of theoretical reason). I
am only obliged to obey the categorical imperative if its aim (the moral world or
the kingdomof ends) is not beyond reach. Thus, according toKant, the decision to
choose moral good rather than evil leads to another decision with the form of an
either/or, either rational faith inGod or themoral despair of the atheist facedwith
the possible futility of her endeavour (cf. KdU 5, p. 452; Beiser 2006, p. 616 f. ;
Caswell 2006, p. 208;Munzel 1999, p. 212;Wood 1970, p. 160). Kant does not deny
that atheists can acquire good moral dispositions, but he sees a problem in their
steadfastness and unwavering commitment to morality. The righteous atheist
Spinoza might strive unselfishly for a morally better world here on earth, and this
is just what his own practical reason demands him to do.However, hewill be faced
with his limited powers to change the world for the better, he will have to ac-
knowledge that nature is indifferent to morality, and he will meet other humans
who are evil and undermine his well-intentioned efforts. He might lead a life that
is nasty,miserable and short, and has to face the prospect of an absurd end, namely
being thrown back “into the abyss of the purposeless chaos of matter” (cf. KdU 5,
p. 452).
According to Kant, this attitude or belief-system of the righteous atheist is not
in the “interest of reason” and the “interest of humanity” (KrVA, pp. 462–476, A
798; cf. KdU 5, p. 455). It might undermine our willingness to steadfastly pursue
the highest good as the goal of our moral volition, and our virtue, “the moral
strength of a human beingos will in fulfilling his duty” (MM 6, p. 405, emphasis
deleted). The idea of God as the omnipotent being which combines the two
distinct elements of the highest good, namely virtue and proportionate happiness,
“meets our natural need, which would otherwise be a hindrance tomoral resolve”
(Religion 6, p. 5). Our resolve would be hindered if we assumed that, though we
knewhow amoral world should look like, we still held that it was impossible. In all
likelihood, our resolve would melt away (see also KpV 5, p. 126; Collins 27,
pp. 317–320 and Kantos assessment of atheism in Denis 2003, pp. 203–208).
This line of thinking parallels Kantos reflections in the philosophy of history,
which is also an antidote against the sorrow (melancholy, Kummer) which can
overcome the morally-minded observer when confronted with the miseries, in-
justices and horrors of world history. This sorrow is dangerous because it can soon
develop into “moral corruption”, the loss of courage, and the pessimistic con-
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viction that human endeavours are pointless and devoid of any meaning (Be-
ginning 8, p. 120 f.; for a discussion see Goldman 2012; Langthaler 2014, p. I,
pp. 251–433; Pollmann 2011). Ideally, the philosophy of history teaches us to be
content with nature (or divine providence) and motivates us not to desist from
working towards the realization of the highest good (cf. Beginning 8, p. 123).Most
importantly, it replaces “disgust” and “despair” when looking at the past and
present with modest hope (Idea 8, p. 30). The difference between the philosophy
of history and the philosophy of religion is that the former is a teleological re-
flection on the possibility of the highest political good, whereas the philosophy of
religion primarily deals with the highest good proper, with the possibility ofmoral
progress and the kingdom of God. Therefore, political and religious cosmopoli-
tanisms do not coincide.
The problem Kant tackles here is one of virtue or the “strength of soul”
(Anthropology 7, p. 293) and of oneos conduct of life. Kantos practical philosophy
leads only to the threshold of moral faith. This faith is subjective insofar as it
requires “moral cognition of oneself” (MM 6, p. 441), honesty, choice and com-
mitment, which can only be done by the individual agent (cf. KdU 5, p. 450 f.; see
for instance the discussion in Dörflinger 2004, pp. 220–223; Stangneth 2000,
pp. 208–210; Wimmer 1990, pp. 77–88; Wood, 1970, pp. 153–187, 252 f. and in
particular Langthaler 2015, p. II, pp. 16–235). I call this dimension personal: Kant
explicitly uses the first person singular when writing about moral faith. It is not
some abstract philosophical thought but a personal confession and conviction in
the first place: “the belief in a God and another world is so interwoven with my
moral disposition that I am in as little danger of ever surrendering the former as I
amworried that the latter can ever be torn away fromme” (KrVB 857; cf. Collins
27, pp. 319–322 where he uses the collective “we” in one of his lectures). Moral
faith is part of oneos own self-understanding.Moral faith involves a choice, but this
choice is not arbitrary, blind, or irrational; it is based on practical concepts and can
be communicated – at least indirectly – to other rational beings (KrV B p. 848 f. ;
Kuehn 1985, p. 167; Pasternack 2011, pp. 294–296 and 314). The dimension is
personal in the sense that the whole of oneos existence is at stake, oneos self-
understanding, oneos “life-conduct” (Lebenswandel ; Religion 6, p. 170 and 175),
not merely some maxims or oneos inner disposition.
This personal understanding is also the background of the idea of aKingdomof
heaven or God or the “church invisible”, since it is interpreted by Kant “as a
symbolic representation aimed merely at stimulating greater hope and courage
and effort in achieving it” (Religion 6, p. 134). The phrase “symbolic repre-
sentation” points at Kantos concept of “symbolism” or “schematism by analogy”.
“In the ascent from the sensible to the supersensible, we can indeed schematize
(render a concept comprehensible through analogy with something in the
senses)” (Religion 6, p. 65 note; see also KdU 5, pp. 351–354 and Chignell 2011, p.
114 f., 124; Wood 2011, p. 140 f.). The symbolic or analogical content for the
rational idea of a moral world is the Kingdom of God. Its features or “requisites”
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correspond with the four categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality
(Religion 6, p. 101 f.; cf. Cheneval 2002, pp. 467–472; Louden 2000, pp. 125–132;
Sala 2004; Wood 1970, pp. 189–200; Wood 2008, pp. 259–269; Wood 2011).
The category of quantity is themost important one. The principles of the ethical
commonwealth should be universal and “lead to universal union in a single
church” (Religion 6, p. 101). It is destined to encompass “the entire human race”,
is distinct from a political community, which governs the external actions of hu-
mans (ibid., p. 96), and is a “universal republic based on the laws of virtue” (ibid.,
p. 98). Furthermore, it coincides with the invisible church, and is the moral vo-
cation (Bestimmung) of the human race (ibid., p. 100 f.; Conflict 7, pp. 49–50, and
15, p. 608 f.). The ethical commonwealth has to be global in reach since each
ethical community – a particular ecclesiastical faith, for instance – is just a “par-
ticular society” which remains in a state of nature in relation to others. Thus it
would not overcome its imperfections or the constant threat of conflict and strife
within its own congregation or with others (Religion 6, p. 96, Conflict 7, p. 50). In
his “Lectures on Metaphysics”, Kant refers to a “spiritual community” and a
“community of the blessed (Seligen)” not yet accessible to us because of our
sensuous intuition. However, all humans who have become “righteous” and de-
veloped their good disposition, no matter if they live in India or in Arabia, have
joined this community “already in this world” (LM 28, p. 299). Its members are
“citizens of a divine state” that is global in reach. According to Kantos herme-
neutical interpretation of the New Testament, Jesus wanted the disciples to be
united in this kingdom “with others of like mind, and if possible with the whole
human race” (Religion 6, p. 134).
Who qualifies as a member in the invisible church? The invisible church “en-
compasses all right-thinking peoplewithin itself and alone, in virtue of its essential
composition, can be the true church universal” (Religion 6, p. 176). The original
refers to “alle Wohldenkende”; the context suggests that these are people who
have understood that true religious service consists in good life-conduct (ibid.).
What about those who are agnostics or atheists, have no concept of religious
service, but have become virtuous in the Kantian sense? Elsewhere Kant argues
that people all over the world are Christians “in potential”, provided that they
have gone through their moral “rebirth” or “revolution” or conversion (Religion
6, p. 47; Collins 27, p. 464), acquired a moral disposition and (therefore) promote
the highest good. Kantos example is Socrates (cf. 23, p. 440). In another passage,
this even includes Spinoza, Kantos example of a virtuous atheist who, according to
Kant, implicitly assumes Godos existence “in praktischer Absicht” even when he
denies cosmotheology (cf. KdU 5, p. 452; 18, p. 542; 27, p. 312; LM 28, p. 299 and
above). This suggests that Kant has a broad understanding of membership in the
invisible church:members do not necessarily have to subscribe to the core articles
of faith of natural religion (freedom, immortality, God) to qualify. Some of them
do; others might be called “anonymous” members. However, in the middle of the
paragraph quoted from above, Kant refers to those who “place their service of
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God … in the disposition to good life-conduct” (Religion 6, p. 176), and this is
described as a conscious act of religious service, not as something implicitly or
anonymously. On the other hand, in the passage Kant contrast true religious
service with a deficient or wrong understanding which he calls “counterfeit
service” (Religion 6, p. 175 f.), so it does not exclude the possibility of anonymous
members. I conclude thatKant should be interpreted as offering an understanding
of membership in the invisible church that is comprehensive, not exclusive. In the
next section, I offer a sketch of Kantos narrative of the coming of the invisible
church, which I think supports my interpretation that Kant favoured a compre-
hensive version.
3. Dynamic Religious Cosmopolitanism: from the Moral
Predisposition to the Triumph of the Invisible Church
My starting point is Kantos theory of predispositions (Anlagen) or germs (Keime).
There are three types of predispositions. “Among the living inhabitants of the earth
the human being is markedly distinguished from all other living beings by his
technical predisposition […], by his pragmatic predisposition […], and by the
moral predisposition in his being” (Anthropology 7, p. 322). The Bestimmung of
humans is to cultivate their capacities or predispositions (Anlagen), especially –
but not exclusively – freedom, self-legislation as well as Selbstbestimmung, self-
determination, morality (cf. KrVA 464; Groundwork 4, p. 396; KdU 5, pp. 434–
436; Anthropology 7, p. 325; Brandt 2009; Louden 2000, pp. 102–106; Rossi 2005
and 2008; and Printy 2013). As Robert Louden has recently pointed out, Bes-
timmung incorporates three meanings (Louden 2014): first, Kant sometimes
compares humanswith animals or even plants, pointing out that they are equipped
with certain germs (Keime), and they are determined to develop in a certain way.
In this context, Bestimmung can be rendered as “determination”, since it is
“merely a matter of proper sowing and planting that these germs develop” (LP 9,
p. 445). Here humans are part of the natural world subject to its laws. The second
meaning relatesBestimmung to the concept of indetermination, as a humanbeing,
even from the perspective of empirical anthropology, is capable of reflection,
deliberation and the freedom of choice, that is, “choosing for himself a way of
living and not being bound to a single one” (Anfang 8, p. 112). This corresponds
with the level of the cultivation of skilfulness and prudence. Finally, as beings with
moral predispositions, we are bestimmt to cultivate or develop them. “The human
being shall make himself better, cultivate himself, and, if he is evil, bring forth
morality in himself” (LP 9, p. 446). This is the level of moral freedom and of
cosmopolitanism, and our Bestimmung is a vocation or a calling: humans “feel
destined [or called] by nature to [develop] … into a cosmopolitan society (cos-
mopolitismus) that is constantly threatened by disunion but generally progresses
toward a coalition” (Anthropology 7, p. 331). The regulative principle of a cos-
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mopolitan society comes in two versions. One is a political union of the whole
human species based on just and coercive laws that are mutual and “come from
themselves” (ibid.). The other one is the moral commonwealth which promotes
virtue and proportionate happiness and is developed in the Religion Within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason (cf. 6, pp. 96–102).
Religious faith (which coincides with natural religion here) is seen as distinct
from the Anlagen, but as a logical consequence of the moral predisposition,
properly understood. As Kant puts it, “faith in a future life […] automatically
imposes itself upon everyone by virtue of the universal moral predisposition in
human nature” (Religion 6, p. 126, my emphasis). This is an echo of Kantos central
– and contested – claim in the Religion and elsewhere that “morality […] in-
evitably leads to religion” (Religion 6, p. 6, my emphasis). Natural religion is
defined as moral faith in immortality and the afterlife, in divine retribution and
justice, based on the awareness that both are absent in theworldwe know. It grows
out of the moral predisposition, but has to be brought under concepts.
Kantos interpretation of history is teleological and reflective. Nature has pur-
poses, and “one can assume as a principle that nature wants every creature to
reach its destiny through the appropriate development of all predispositions of its
nature” (Anthropology 7, p. 329). Kantos anthropology “is not merely a descrip-
tive account of human culture. Rather, his aim is to offer the species a moral map
that they can use tomove toward their collective destiny” (Louden 2000, p. 106; cf.
Louden 2011, p. 76 f.; Louden 2014). This is what distinguishes pragmatic from
physiological anthropology. “Physiological knowledge of the human being con-
cerns the investigation of what naturemakes of the human being; pragmatic, the
investigation of what he as a free-acting beingmakes of himself, or can and should
make of himself” (Anthropology 7, p. 119). The key teleological assumption is
that these predispositions and germs are potentials that could and should be
developed – it is each individualos task as “an animal endowedwith the capacity of
reason (animal rationabile)” to develop this potential and to make oneself “a
rational animal” (Anthropology 7, p. 321; LP 9, p. 445).
In his writings on anthropology and the philosophy of history, Kant has offered
a sketch of the development of the capacities and potentials of the human species.
The emphasis is on external behaviour, the rise of culture, and the regulation of
external spheres of action, culminating in the regulative idea of a cosmopolitan
condition, “as thewomb in which all original predispositions of the human species
will be developed” (Idea 8, p. 28). In the following paragraphs, I will try to outline
Kantos sketch of the history of the church (Kirchengeschichte) – a story difficult to
tell since it refers to inner moral dispositions and pure religious faith (neither of
which can be observed; cf. Religion 6, p. 108). Yet I claim that Kant did tell this
story in theReligion, assuming as his starting point the concept of puremoral faith
accessible to any human being since all of us share the same moral predisposition
(see above).
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This is Kantos anthropological starting point; the historical origins of this moral
faith are not specified. In “Conjectural beginning of human history” (1786), the
emphasis is on the development of reason, freedom and morality from their
“original predisposition in the nature of the human being” (8, p. 109), not on the
unfolding of moral faith. The early humans are worried about their future and
death, but console themselves with the thought that they will “live on in their
posterity” (8, p. 113). Religious issues are absent from Kantos “pleasure trip”,
although he uses a sacred text (the book of Genesis) as his “map” (8, p. 109). Yet
we can safely assume that for Kant, manifest religious practice started with an
aberration, in agreement with Kantos claim – echoing Rousseau – that the history
of natural predispositions “begins from good, for that is the work of God”,
whereas the history of religious practice started “from evil, for it is thework of the
human being” (8, p. 115). The history of religious practice starts with “the servile
worship of God (or gods)” (Religion 6, p. 176), based on human awareness of
being helpless. This worship turned into “temple service” when it became public,
which in turn transformed itself into “ecclesiastical service” once the “moral
culture” of humans developed further (ibid.). All this is nothing but what Kant
calls paganism, which “consists in passing off the externals (non-essentials) of
religion as essential” (Conflict 7, p. 50). Externals are “merely statutory teach-
ings” (ibid.); at the beginning, articles of faith and dogma triumph over “pure
religions faith” which “locates the essence of all divine worship in the human
beingos morality” (Conflict 7, p. 49).
Thoughhe does occasionallymention non-Western systems of faith (e.g.End 8,
p. 335 f.; Religion 6, p. 176), Kantos historical account almost exclusively focuses
on Judaism and Christianity. Judaism, Kant claims, is “not a religion at all” but
based on a political rather than religious constitution with an emphasis on “ex-
ternal observance” rather than moral dispositions. It emphasises worldly pun-
ishments and rewards rather than “faith in a future life”, and a constitution that
has resulted in an exclusive, uncosmopolitan community (Religion 6, pp. 125–
127). It has been hampered by “the garb of the ancient cult, which now serves no
purpose and even suppresses any true religious attitude” (Conflict 7, p. 53).
Judaism is the negative foil to make Christianity shine. One of its distinct
advantages over the Jewish faith is, according to Kant, its cosmopolitan nature,
namely the attempt to found a universal church open to “the whole human race”
(Religion 6, p. 127). In other words, it is “a religion valid for the world and not for
one single people” (ibid.; see also 6, p. 157).When dealing with Christianity, Kant
drew a line between the teachings of Christ according to the New Testament and
what later generations of theologians and church leaders made out of them – a
web of beliefs Kant summarized under the concept of ecclesiastical faith. Kant
openly expressed his admiration for Christ, and referred to Christianity as
“supposedly destined to be the world religion” (End 8, p. 339; cf. Religion 6, p.
131). In his publications, Kant repeatedly asserted that only the Bible and
Christianity properly understood corresponded with pure morality and practical
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knowledge “drawn from the human beingos own soul”. For that very reason they
“acquired so extensive a sphere of efficacy and achieved such lasting influence on
the world” (Conflict 7, p. 58; see also Religion 6, p. 131 and 162; KdU 5, p. 472
note; Conflict 7, p. 9). So Kant also offered his explanation why Christianity was
destined to become world religion: it is the religion where the inner principle,
namely the principle of morality, triumphs over external statutes and dogma. All
we have to do is simply “make room” for this moral religion. “This teaching is the
true religious doctrine, based on the criticism of practical reason, that works with
divine power on the hearts of all human beings toward their fundamental im-
provement and unites them in one universal (though invisible) church” (Conflict
7, p. 59). Christ – usually referred to as the “teacher of the Gospel” (e.g. Religion
6, p. 128, 158; End 8, p. 338) – did not want blind obedience to his own will, but
appealed as “a friend of humanity” “to the hearts of his fellow human beings on
behalf of their own well-understood will, i. e. of the way they would of themselves
voluntarily act if they examined themselves properly” (End 8, p. 338). In other
words, Jesus above all turned peopleos attention to their ownmoral predisposition
and practical reason, and introduced “a pure religious faith” (Religion 6, p. 131;
cf. 127, p. 159 f.).
In this way Kant argues for a total match between the teachings of Christ and
the voice of practical reason. Kant leaves it open “whether the first Christians […]
truly improved morally” (Religion 6, p. 130). Once Christianity developed a
“learned public”, however, it soon diluted the idea of a pure moral religion, and
began to include “a certain admixture of paganism” (Conflict 7, p. 50; Religion 6,
p. 167), that is, it added externals as essential to the faith. This led to the rise of
mysticism and orthodoxy, “the view that belief in dogma”, historical belief and
observing church practices were sufficient or the core of religion (Conflict 7, p. 60,
54, 80; Religion 6, p. 130; Conflict 7, p. 36). Eventually the ecclesiastics under-
mined their very purpose, namely cultivating religion: they focused on the ex-
ternals and neglected the essential, namely “impressing on their parishes moral
principles” and cultivating a “moral disposition” (Conflict 7, p. 80).Kant reads the
history ofChristianity from the early church to his present, the eighteenth century,
as a history of distortion, aberration and perversion, where the proper hierarchy
(moral faith should come first) was turned upside down (cf. Religion 6, p. 165 and
pp. 170–175).
In his narrative, Kant jumps from theReformation to the eighteenth century. It
is perhaps significant that there is no special place for Martin Luther. Kant dis-
misses the “so-called religious struggles” of modern European history as mere
“squabbles over ecclesiastical faiths”. They donot deserve the name“religious” in
a strict sense since religion is a matter of the inner life and “depends on moral
dispositions” (Religion 6, p. 108). Various ecclesiastical faiths distinguish them-
selves in terms of “style” but not in terms of principle (Religion 6, p. 176). The
process of reform has reached a climax in the Age of Enlightenment, and Kant
does not specify when it started. In fact, he does not have to do that, since “the
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seed of the true religious faith” (Religion 6, p. 131) has been present from the
beginning, as part of the human condition (see above). The goal of reform is clear:
ecclesiastical faith should be “rectified” by pure moral faith (Conflict 7, p. 51;
Religion 6, p. 132 f., 176). The present situation is unacceptable: “The clergyman
holds the layperson strictly and constantly in his immaturity. The people have no
voice and no judgment in regard to the path they have to take to the kingdom of
heaven” (Anthropology 7, p. 209). Immaturity has to be replaced bymaturity. The
basis of this reform is the process of Enlightenment, where “the community is
susceptible and inclined to give a hearing […] to a practical reasonwhich has been
illuminated” by religious doctrines (End 8, p. 336) as well as by “the repre-
sentation” of themoral law (ibid., 338). Intellectuals including clerics working in a
public sphere make public use of their reason and should enjoy unrestricted
freedom to propose ideas how to reform ecclesiastical faiths (Religion 6, p. 132 f. ;
Enlightenment 8, pp. 36–38; End 8, p. 336). Religious reform is part and parcel of
the process of Enlightenment, which in turn is a necessary condition of the human
species moving towards its vocation. “People gradually work their way out of
barbarism of their own accord if only one does not intentionally contrive to keep
them in it” (Enlightenment 8, p. 41).
In the Starke manuscript of 1790–1791, where Kant reflects upon a key prob-
lemof human history, namely the transition from culture or civilization (revolving
around skilfulness and prudence) to moralization, and calls “the crossing-over
[Übergang]” from the former to the latter ”the most difficult condition of the
human race”, he refers to people like himself “who are working on the unity of
religion, on the step of this crossing-over from civilization to moralization. Inner
religion stands in now for the position of legal constraint” (quoted in Louden
2000, p. 42). Apparently Kant saw the writings of Rousseau, Basedow, Spalding
and other like-minded religious reformers (including himself) as attempts to re-
cover the moral and rational kernel of Christianity and to educate the younger
generation in the spirit of a reformed Christian faith, thus contributing to the
promotion of the ethical commonwealth and the coming kingdom of God on
earth. Like these andotherEnlightenment philosophers or theologians,Kant held
that most historical faiths were – in all likelihood – just manifestations of one
universalmoral or natural religion (LP9, p. 496; Peace 8, p. 367 note;Religion 6, p.
153 f.), which again underlined “the unity of humankind as that of a family” (LP 9,
p. 494).
I have argued above that Kantos narrative of the coming of the invisible church
supportsmy interpretation thatKant favoured a comprehensive version. “Church
history” can reflectively be interpreted as the move in world history – understood
by someEnlightenment thinkers in a newway as a collective singular (cf. Sommer
2006, pp. 252, pp. 351–369) – from external statutes and dogma to the inner moral
disposition, the religion of the heart – which is invisible just like the church itself.
As a consequence, and in contrast to previous theologies, Kantos narrative and his
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religious cosmopolitanism do not have to insist on clear dividing lines between
believers and non-believers.
Kant summarizes his theological chiliasm in 1793: “Such is […] the work of the
good principle – unnoticed to human eye yet constantly advancing – in erecting a
power and a kingdom for itself within the human race, in the form of a community
according to the laws of virtue that proclaims the victory over evil and, under its
dominion, assures the world of an eternal peace” (Religion 6, p. 124). This is not
theoretical knowledge, but a regulative principle, practical faith and hope, namely
that eventually the germ of the good principle will be developed among people
across the globe. The millennium at the end of history is not simply a symbolic
period of time, but perpetual peace, based not on coercive laws (as in the phi-
losophy of history) but on non-coercive moral laws. The human race would have
reached its vocation.
Kant could have stopped here, at the end of the exposition of his religious
cosmopolitanism. This would have been typical of a trend of Enlightenment
philosophy, a favourable attitude towards natural religion and its core, morality
(see Religion 6, p. 170 and 175), but scepticism or open hostility towards “his-
torical faiths” and organized religion, for instance Roman Catholicism (see for
instanceRousseau 1997, p. 146 f.). Kant is offbeat and provocative, especially for a
secularized age. He complements his religious cosmopolitanism with a Christian
cosmopolitanism. Kantos allegiance to the Christian tradition is the surprising
element, though it can also be found in most German writers of the Enlighten-
ment like Spalding up to the 1780ies (see Spalding 2006, pp. 202–204 and 217–219,
Allison 2009, pp. 52–56, and Winter 2000, pp. 28–30 and 82–89).
Kant clearly favoured and privileged a modernized form of Christianity,
something which is usually eyed with suspicion by contemporary commentators,
since it sounds so un-cosmopolitan and rather Eurocentric (see for instance
Louden 2000, pp. 130–132; McCarthy 1986, pp. 89–91 and 101; Sala 2004, p. 230).
Significantly, Kant was familiar withMosesMendelsohnos Jerusalem oder über die
religiöse Macht und Judentum (1783) and even praised the authoros attempt to
interpret the Jewish faith as compatible with natural religion in his private cor-
respondence (see the letter to Mendelssohn, August 16 1783, 10, p. 347), but he
denied this possibility in the published writings, most notably the Religion (cf. 6,
pp. 125–128).
4. Apology: the Christian churches and religious formation
In this section, I am going to discuss two related Kantian claims. The first one is
that religious formation (as developed in the previous section) has to be rooted,
that is, has to take as its starting point an ecclesiastical faith with its statutory laws.
I argue that this claim is plausible. Kantos second claim is that only the Christian
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churches can offer this starting point. I do not find this argument completely
convincing.
The whole species reaches its vocation by promoting the highest moral good in
the world. This social goal takes the organizational form of the ethical com-
monwealth. In the preliminary notes to the essay “Über den Gemeinspruch”
(published in 1793), Kant equates the “cosmopolitan union (Welt-Bürgerliche
Einheit)” with the French revolutionarieso ideal of fraternitt (Verbrüderung ; 23, p.
139). The concept used for a global union through contract is “federalist”; “cos-
mopolitan” is the word for amoral unionwithout a contract, presumably based on
the cultivated morality of its members (23, p. 140). According to the Religion
(1793), the ethical commonwealth is promoted by religious communities, pro-
vided that they reform themselves following the principles of pure rational
morality and moral faith and that they avoid the pitfalls of counterfeit service.
“The idea of a people of God cannot be realized (by human organization) except
(nicht anders als) in the form of a church” (Religion 6, p. 100, my emphasis). Kant
tries to mediate the a priori idea of an ethical community with the human con-
dition and historical developments, and consequently interprets the visible
churches – apparently he has Christian churches in mind – as symbols or arche-
types of the idea of an invisible church. They are steps towards the realization of
the universal, invisible cosmopolitan church, the Kingdom of God (cf. Religion 6,
p. 101 and 122).
Kantos arguments for an institutional framework have been summarized by
AllenWood (see for the followingWood 2011, pp. 137–140). The starting point is
Kantos juxtaposition of pure rational faith and its emphasis on good life-conduct
with historical faiths and their statutory laws; yet Kant immediately attempts to
mediate the two. Pure rational faith cannot be perceived or apprehended directly
unless it is mediated by ecclesiastical faiths. Believers must therefore work within
these faiths in their search for the only true religion – that of practical reason.
These institutions are flawed (since they have been created by human beings), but
they are the only means at disposal to fight against radical evil and to promote the
idea of a moral commonwealth. There is a parallel with the political realm (cf.
Wood 2011, p. 138 f.), Kant assumes that states were originally despotic and un-
just. Political history can reflectively be interpreted as the struggle of humans to
transform these unjust institutions into republican governments corresponding
with the idea of right. The same holds true for international relations. They start
with aggression, expansion, colonialism, and a flawed theory of the law of nations
(see for instance Peace 8, p. 355 and p. 358 f.). It is the task of humans, in their
attempt to promote the highest political good, to reform these relations with the
help of their own reason. Needless to say that Kant saw himself as participating in
this cosmopolitan enterprise. The philosophy of history “with a cosmopolitan
intent” is the sophisticated, critical reflection upon state and international right
and its potential of reform (cf. Idea 8, pp. 29–31 and Conflict 4, pp. 81–84).
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The analogy between ecclesiastical faiths and imperfect states is incomplete.
These faiths, even if they take the form favoured by Kant, are mere stepping
stones, whereas the republic approaching the ideal constitution seems like a
proper end of politics. On the other hand, Kant seemed to hold that the citizenso
participation in a republican government guaranteeing and fostering the public
use of reason would in all likelihood cultivate their moral predispositions and
cognitive capacities. In particular, a republican form of government might help
citizens to train the threemaxims of the enlargedway of thinking, namely thinking
for oneself, thinking consistently, and assuming the perspective of others (cf. KdU
5, pp. 294–296,Moran 2012, p. 213 f.,Munzel 1999, pp. 175–181 andCavallar 2015,
pp. 133–146). In this way, the republican government, even though it is an end in
itself, is at the same time a stepping stone that might promote morality, critical
thinking, and a critically disciplined, moral religion.
I turn now to Kantos arguments for the Christian churches. As mentioned
above, I do not find them completely convincing. I start with a reconstruction of
Kantos arguments.
First, only the Christian churches acknowledge the human propensity to evil.
According to Kant, the problem of ancient pagan philosophy, of Epicureans and
Stoics, is that, unlike Christianity, they do not have a conception of radical evil
(Religion 6, pp. 57–59). This is the conscious and deliberate subordination of the
moral law under a disposition (Gesinnung) that gives the “subjective principle of
self-love” priority (Religion, 6, p. 36). Interpreters have not failed to emphasize
that Kantos doctrine of evil is close to, and shares some similarities with, the
Christian doctrine of peccatum originarium, or original sin, though there are also
profound differences (cf. Religion 6, p. 31; see for instanceHorn 2011, p. 43 and 64
and Forschner 2011, pp. 83–89). The doctrine is essential for moral discipline –
moral training or ethical ascetics – and thus also for any successful moral for-
mation (Bildung) since it reminds educators that they cannot start with natural
innocence “but must rather begin from the presupposition of a depravity of our
power of choice in adopting maxims” (Religion 6, p. 51). Educators can reason-
ably assume suitable predispositions and a “germ of goodness” (ibid., p. 45); but
they should also acknowledge the willos tendency to subordinate the incentives
stimulating morality or the rational commands of duty to the incentives of self-
love (cf. Religion 6, pp. 32–39).
Second, Kant interprets Christianity as a moral religion at its core. His primary
witness is Jesus Christ, who is credited for introducing pure morality (cf. Religion
6, p. 160) and “pure religious faith”, which has the potential to become “a uni-
versal world-religion” (ibid., p. 131; cf. Conflict 7, p. 58 f. and refl. 1396, 15, p. 608).
The “world religion”whichKant favours andwhich is universal since it is valid for
every human being (Religion 6, p. 157) is the rational core of the Christian reli-
gion. “The teacher of the Gospel manifested the Kingdom of God on earth to his
disciples only from its glorious, edifying, and moral side, namely in terms of the
merit of being citizens of a divine state; and he instructed themas towhat they had
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to do, not only that they attain to it themselves, but that they be united in it with
others of like mind, and if possible with the whole human race” (Religion 6, p.
134).One finds familiarKantian elements, the emphasis on universalmorality and
moral action (“what they had to do”), the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship in its
moral version (it is not a matter of politics or right, but of religion rooted in
morality), and the claim that like the idea of republicanism, this religious com-
monwealth should be global in reach. The novel and unusual element is the
central role of Christ and of Christianity.
Third, Kant holds that moral as well as proper religious education is only
possible in the visible Christian churches.When introducing the idea of the ethical
commonwealth, Kant frequently compares it with a juridical community, for in-
stance a state (Religion 6, pp. 96–99). This comparison highlights what Stroud
calls the “problem of force”: “The situation concerning moral improvement
seems relatively bleak, since nothing actively can be done” (Stroud 2005, p. 332).
However, as outlined in the second section, Kant does have a sophisticated theory
of moral education, his ethical didactics. The advantage of the Christian churches
is that they do have an insight into the propensity of the humanwill, they know the
enemy of virtue, the do not downplay or ignore radical evil. The “thesis of innate
evil” is essential for moral discipline, that is, moral training or ethical ascetics (cf.
Religion 6, p. 51; seeKoch 2003, pp. 299–314 onKantos ascetics). Ethical ascetics is
the third part of Kantos moral education or formation (Bildung), the other two
being moral instruction (in turn divided into catechism, casuistry and the use of
examples) and moral motivation. Moral instruction aims at providing moral
knowledge; moral motivation tries to help the student to adopt the proper pure
moral disposition; moral training aims at the capacity to follow the moral law and
at virtue, since “between maxim and deed there still is a wide gap” (Religion 6, p.
47; see also Cavallar 2015, pp. 117–132 and Munzel 2012).
Kant developed his theory of moral formation in the “doctrine of the method”
of his major works of ethics (see for instance KpV 5, pp. 151–161). Since the
primary task of the churches is to cultivate morality, their methods often overlap
with those of moral formation. Kant inserts didactical advice in the Religion, for
instance with the claim that arousing the “feeling of the sublimity of our moral
vocation is especially praiseworthy as a means of awakening moral dispositions”
(Religion 6, p. 50). There is a parallel passage in the “doctrine of the method” of
the second Critique (cf. KpV 5, p. 161). When Kant claims in the Religion that
moral formation in a human being has to start with “the transformation of his
attitude of mind” (Religion 6, p. 48), a moral revolution or “change of heart”
(ibid., p. 47), then he repeats a familiar assertion of his ethical didactics (cf.
Anthropology 7, p. 294; LP 9, p. 480 f.). Other parallel passages concern the
“example of good people” (Religion 6, p. 48 and below).
The didactical tools of the Christian religious communities are diverse. They
can be divided into two groups (see Stroud 2005 and 2008). The first form of non-
coercive measures is rational persuasion and overlaps with the moral instruction
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of the ethical writings. Scott Stroud claims that “a Kantian notion of rhetoric,
through its use of morally imbued religious subject matter, is key means to in-
stantiate conditions” that help to foster the ethical community, in the form of
encouragement of the community members to cultivate their own moral predis-
positions, and respect for the moral law (Stroud 2005, p. 329). The methods em-
ployed are “vivid presentation” and the presentation and discussion of moral
examples (ibid., p. 330). Kantos position on the use of examples is quite complex
(see Guyer 2012 for an introduction). Kant rejects them if they become artificial
aids, go-carts (Gängelwagen) or leading-strings (Leitbänder)which block peopleos
efforts to think and judge for themselves (cf. KrV B 173 f.; LP 9, p. 475). Used
properly inmoral formation, however, examples can cultivate the “predisposition
to the good” (Religion 6, p. 48; see alsoMM6, p. 479); they can serve as proof that
morality is not an illusion, but “really possible” (MM 6, p. 480; see also KpV 5, p.
158). Any possible example has to pass the test of purity first, it must be judged or
“appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to whether it is also
worthy to serve as an original example, that is, as a model; it can by no means
authoritatively provide the concept of morality” (Groundwork 4, p. 408). Ideally,
examples bridge the gap between life and themoral lawwe inherently know about
and just have to become aware of. Kant interprets Jesus Christ as amoral example
that can and should be emulated, “as proof that so pure and exalted a moral
goodness can be practised and attained by us” (Religion 6, p. 64). Jesus is the idea
of moral perfection, of humanity, and – again – a schema by which we make an
idea comprehensible via analogy (cf. Religion 6, p. 60, 65, 75 f. , 80, and 132; cf.
Conflict 7, p. 59). One corollary is that Christ should not be turned into a deity
standing beyond human frailty; this would make him an ideal beyond human
reach and emulation. Jesus has to be “totally human” (Religion 6, p. 64 f.). At any
rate, the “vivid presentation” and the presentation and discussion of moral ex-
amples in church services, for example with readings from the New Testament,
help to foster moral predispositions and respect for the moral law.
The second form of non-coercive measures used in Christian churches is rit-
uals: “Singing praises, prayers, and going to church should only give the human
being new strength, new courage for improvement, or they should be the ex-
pression of a heart inspired by the idea of duty. They are only preparations for
good works, but not good works themselves, and one cannot please the highest
being otherwise than by becoming a better human being” (LP 9, p. 494; cf. Re-
ligion 6, p. 192 f.). Kant repeats a familiar thesis here, that religion should be based
on morality (and not the other way round), and that moral education has to
precede religious instruction (cf. LP 9, p. 494 f.; MM 6, p. 478; Religion 6, p. 154).
Yet Kant never claimed that religious rituals should be replaced by moral action;
he concedes that they do serve an important function, namely preparing for
morality and strengthening virtue, and thus they complement moral formation.
Religious formation should follow moral education. Performing rituals has a
subordinate, but still legitimate role to play in the life of the moral person. They
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offer something that the moral law itself cannot provide: when performed with
the proper disposition, they may give “new strength, new courage”.
The churches and their rituals have the function to strengthen the moral dis-
position and rational faith, to avoid despair about our own depravity and finitude,
and to guard the secrets of this rational faith, namely the “holymysteries” in terms
of the realization of the cosmopolitan Kingdom of God to come (cf. Religion 6, p.
138). For present purposes, the first and third mysteries are most relevant. The
first one is that “of the call (Berufung) (of human beings to be citizens of an ethical
state)” (Religion 6, p. 142). With our limited human understanding, we cannot
solve the riddle of being free and at the same time created beings called by God.
The thirdmystery is that of election (Erwählung); in a similar vein, this mystery is
impenetrable (cf. ibid., p. 143). The important thing to note is that for Kant,
humans do not simply become members of the ethical commonwealth by re-
specting others or letting them pursue their ends (I see this as a frequent con-
temporary interpretation; see for instanceMoran 2012, p. 83). The commitment to
morality is a necessary, but not sufficient condition. In addition – and this is the
religious dimension properly speaking – agents attempting to become moral be-
ings explicitly understand their envisioned good life-conduct as authentic reli-
gious service, and perceive themselves as possible citizens of the divine com-
monwealth. Individuals have ordained their moral disposition to this Kingdom.
Communal rituals are an experience of the attempt to cultivate oneos moral dis-
position in a community (cf. Stroud 2008, p. 153). At the end of theReligion, Kant
discusses four forms of religious activities, namely prayer, church-going, baptism
and rituals maintaining the religious community such as the holy communion (cf.
Religion 6, pp. 194–200). The underlying idea is that individuals in their visible
churches come to understand themselves as “citizens in the Kingdom of God” or
“in a divine state” (Religion 6, p. 199; cf. ibid., p. 195 note, 197). Churchgoing, for
instance, has the purpose “to excite the moral incentives of each individual
through an external solemnity which portrays the union of all human beings in the
shared desire for the Kingdom of God” (Religion 6, p. 197 note). Again, the
invisible is represented symbolically. Again, the invisible church is cosmopolitan
in the sense that themoral agent should not wish that anyone is excluded from this
kind of community.
Kant is successful only in the first part, namely the argument for an institutional
framework. Kantos arguments for the Christian churches are more problematical.
He holds that the biblical stories are “valid and binding practically, for the whole
world and at all times” so that anyone “can recognize his duty in it” (Religion 6, p.
83). However, Kant reaches this cosmopolitan conclusion only after he has in-
terpreted these stories according to his hermeneutical approach (on Kantos her-
meneutics see Höffe 2011, pp. 231–247 and Wood 2011, pp. 142–145). At times
Kant displays a hermeneutical openness, for instance, when he claims that his
interpretation is perhaps not “the only meaning according to which we can derive
something edifying from a text” (Religion 6, p. 43 note; cf. 84 note). In addition,
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he believes that ecclesiastical faiths other than the Christian one have also tended
to read their holy books with the puremoral faith as their supreme interpreter (cf.
Religion 6, p. 110 f.). However,Kant does not pursue this thought any further; and
in other passages, he bluntly asserts that only the Christian religion meets the
standards of “moral religion” (cf. Religion 6, p. 52). This claim is fairly dubious, to
put it mildly. Philosophers like Karl Jaspers have argued that sages in various
civilizations during the so-called Axial Age (roughly 800 to 200 BC) developed
forms of faith such as Taoism or Buddhism going beyond the old paganisms and
emphasizing the importance of the moral or inner dimension, and that this was a
global phenomenon not restricted to Western civilization (see Jaspers 1953 and
Armstrong 2006). In addition, there are passageswhereKant could be interpreted
as having developed an understanding of membership in the invisible church that
is comprehensive, not exclusive (see section 3). If “church history” can reflectively
be interpreted as the move in world history from external statutes and dogma to
the inner moral disposition, to the religion of the heart, then Kantos religious
cosmopolitanism does not have to insist on clear dividing lines between believers
and non-believers.
For Kant, ecclesiastical faiths (and especially Christianity) are historically in-
dispensable in the evolution of themoral predispositions and religious convictions
of the human species, and in the process of cultivating a critically disciplinedmoral
religion (see sections 3 and 4). However, eventually these ecclesiastical faiths
could be dispensed with, since they are mere stepping stones. This is not the case
with moral religion. Given certain anthropological and epistemological features
of human beings, such as our frailty, being susceptible to temptation, our scepti-
cism concerning the validity of themoral law or its feasibility, and an inclination to
give way to despair, moral (cosmopolitan) faith is a necessary supplement to
strengthen virtue and our commitment to morality.
In the history of religion, apology is defined as the attempt “to lend credibility
to oneos own convictions […] in the face of other […] worldviews” (Nüchtern
2007). Kantos interpretation of Christianity has apologetic elements. This is one
side of the coin. The other one is expressed in the following question: Is there
anything recognizably Christian that survives Kantos critique of so-called histor-
ical faiths in the light of his own moral religion? The issue goes beyond the scope
of this essay. It requires an analysis of the concept of “Christianity” as it was
understood during Kantos time, an investigation into the apologetic literature of
the age, into Kantos bible hermeneutics, and into what he understood as the
essence or core of the Christian faith (for a historical introduction see Beutel
2009).
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5. Conclusion: Between tentative and Expansive Centrism
Critics might point out that Kantos religious cosmopolitanism is apparently cos-
mopolitan in a very limited way, or might not even deserve this label. A standard
criticism is that it amounts to nothing but a refined, “enlightened” version of
expansive centrism, where oneos own reinterpreted tradition – namely, Western
European Christianity – is the only legitimate standard and, since it is declared
“universally valid”, is destined to, or should become, a global project.
Kantos centrism is partly tentative or transitory, that is, assumes that in prin-
ciple, different perspectives are possible, and is open towards different positions
(see Wimmer 2004, pp. 15–17, 54–58 for a definition of centrism). The starting
point is oneos own philosophical endeavours, but these are exposed to rational
scrutiny just like other endeavours of a similar kind. In this qualified sense Kant
offers a cosmopolitan philosophy of religion. The locus classicus of expansive
centrism is the New Testament, where Christ tells his disciples: “[G]o and make
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son
and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded
you” (Matthew 28, 19–20). Kant construes the expansive centrism of Christianity
as mere tentative centrism, and his basis is an interpretation of Christianity as a
cosmopolitan-minded, universalmoral religion (see for instanceReligion 6, p. 127
and 134).Other cosmopolitan elements areKantos belief in a benevolentGodwho
loves the whole human race (Religion 6, p. 65 note) and his assertion that only
pure religious faith, and not any ecclesiastical faith, is truly universal since it is
based on the universal principles of common human reason and in principle
intelligible to any rational being. Furthermore, there is his claim that people all
over the world are Christians “in potential” provided that they have acquired a
moral disposition, promote the highest good, and have a natural religion; Kantos
example is Socrates (cf. 23, p. 440). Finally, there is his political argument that
world peace can be promoted if historical faiths, including Christianity, which
have traditionally been sources of disagreement, sects, conflict, bloodshed, and
war (cf. Religion 6, p. 131; Conflict 7, p. 50), reform themselves towards a pure
rational faith.
I have argued in this essay that Kantos religious cosmopolitanism is Janus-
faced. There is a tension between a rational understanding of moral faith and an
embedded approach that culminates in an apology of Christianity. Therefore,
Kantos philosophy of religion is cosmopolitan in a qualified sense because it
combines a reinterpreted, rationalized Christianity with the formal capacity to
think for oneself in community with others and with an understanding of morality
that claims to be universal. Kantos religious cosmopolitanism is both dynamic and
embedded. It is rooted in its own tradition, but also ready to go beyond the
confines of any particular historical faith. Kantos religious cosmopolitanism can
thus be interpreted as situated between tentative and expansive centrism.
147
Between Cosmopolis and Apology
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
References
All references toKantos works are in accordance with theAkademie-EditionVol. 1–29 of
Kantis Gesammelte Schriften.Berlin – Leipzig, 1902 ff. References to theCritique of Pure
Reason follow the customary pagination of the first (A) and second (B) edition. The
English translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
Cambridge and New York 1992 ff. The following abbreviations are used:
Beginning = Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (1786), Conjectural be-
ginning of human history.
Anthropology=Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), Anthropology from a
Pragmatic Standpoint.
Collins = Collins, From the Lectures of Professor Kant (1784–1785).
Conflict = Streit der Fakultäten (1798), Conflict of the Faculties.
End = Das Ende aller Dinge (1794), End of all things.
Enlightenment = Beantwortung der Frage, Was ist Aufklärung? (1784), An Answer to
the Question, What is Enlightenment?
Groundwork = Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals.
Idea = Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), Idea
toward a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.
KrV=Kritik der reinenVernunft (1781, 1787). Cited byA/B pagination, Critique of Pure
Reason.
KpV = Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), Critique of Practical Reason.
KdU = Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), Critique of the Power of Judgment.
LM = Vorlesungen über Metaphysik, Lectures on metaphysics.
LP = Pädagogik, Lectures on Pedagogy.
MM =Metaphysik der Sitten (1797–1798), Metaphysics of Morals.
Peace = Zum ewigen Frieden, Ein philosophischer Entwurf (1795), Toward Perpetual
Peace, A Philosophical Project.
Religion=Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßenVernunft (1793), ReligionWithin
the Boundaries of Mere Reason.
Theodicy=Über dasMisslingen aller philosophischenVersuche in der Theodicee (1791),
On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy.
Allison, Henry E. : “Reason, Revelation, and History in Lessing and Kant”, in : Inter-
national Yearbook of German Idealism (7) 2009, pp. 35–57.
Armstrong, Karen : The Great Transformation: The Beginning of our Religious Tradi-
tions. New York 2006.
Beiser, Frederick: “Moral Faith and the Highest Good”, in: Guyer, Paul (ed.): The
Cambridge Companion to Kant, pp. 588–629.
Beutel, Albrecht: Kirchengeschichte im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Göttingen 2009.
Brandt, Reinhard: Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant. Hamburg 2009.
Caswell, Matthew: “Kantos Conception of the Highest Good, the Gesinnung, and the
Theory of Radical Evil”, in: Kant-Studien (97) 2006, pp. 184–209.
148
Georg Cavallar
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
Cavallar, Georg: “Cosmopolitanisms in Kantos philosophy”, in: Ethics and Global Pol-
itics (5) 2012, pp. 95–118.
Id.: Kantos Embedded Cosmopolitanism: History, Philosophy, and Education for World
Citizens (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, vol. 183). Berlin – Boston 2015.
Cheneval, Francis: Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Bedeutung.Über die Entstehung und
die philosophischenGrundlagen des supranationalen und kosmopolitischenDenkens
der Moderne. Basel 2002.
Chignell, Andrew: “The Devil, the Virgin, and the Envoy. Symbols of Moral Struggle in
Religion, Part Two, Section Two”, in: Höffe, Otfried (ed.): Religion, pp. 111–129.
Denis, Lara: “Kantos Criticism of Atheism”, in: Kant-Studien (94) 2003, pp. 198–219.
Id.: “Autonomy and the Highest Good”, in: Kantian Review (10) 2005, pp. 33–59.
Id. (ed.): Kantos Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide. Cambridge 2010.
Dörflinger, Bernd: „Führt Moral unausbleiblich zur Religion? Überlegungen zu einer
These Kants“, in: Fischer (ed.):Metaphysik, pp. 207–223.
Fischer, Norbert (ed.): Kants Metaphysik und Religionsphilosophie. Hamburg 2004.
Fischer, Norbert / Forschner, Maximilian (eds.): Die Gottesfrage in der Philosophie
Immanuel Kants. Freiburg – Basel – Wien 2010.
Forschner,Maximilian : „Über die verschiedenenBedeutungen des ,Hangs zumBösenp“,
in: Höffe (ed.) : Religion, pp. 71–90.
Goldman, Loren: “In Defense of Blinders: On Kant, Political Hope, and the Need for
Practical Belief”, in: Political Theory (40) 2012, pp. 497–523.
Guyer, Paul (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cam-
bridge 2006.
Id.: “Examples of Moral Possibility”, in: Roth, Klas / Surprenant, Chris W. (eds.): Kant
and Education, pp. 126–138.
Höffe, Otfried (ed.): Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. Berlin
2011.
Id.: „Philosophische Grundsätze der Schriftauslegung: Ein Blick in den Streit der Fa-
kultäten“, in: Höffe, Otfried (ed.): Religion, pp. 231–247.
Horn, Christoph: „Die menschliche Gattungsnatur: Anlagen zumGuten und Hang zum
Bösen“, in: Höffe, Otfried (ed.): Religion, pp. 43–69.
Jaspers, Karl: The Origin and Goal of History. London 1953.
Kleingeld, Pauline: Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Cit-
izenship. Cambridge 2012.
Koch, Lutz: Kants ethische Didaktik. Würzburg 2003.
Id.: „Kants kosmopolitische Erziehungsidee“, in: Bacin, Stefano / Ferrarin, Alfredo / La
Rocca, Claudio / Ruffing, Margit (eds.): Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher
Absicht, vol. 4. Berlin 2013, pp. 720–728.
Kuehn,Manfred: “Kantos TranscendentalDeduction ofGodos Existence as a Postulate of
Pure Practical Reason”, in: Kant-Studien (76) 1985, pp. 152–169.
Langthaler, Rudolf: Geschichte, Ethik und Religion im Anschluss an Kant. Philoso-
phische Perspektiven „zwischen skeptischer Hoffnungslosigkeit und dogmatischem
Trotz”. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Sonderband 19. 2 vols., Berlin 2014.
Louden, Robert B.: Kantos Impure Ethics. From Rational Beings to Human Beings.
Oxford 2000.
149
Between Cosmopolis and Apology
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
Id.: The World WeWant: How andWhy the Ideals of the Enlightenment Still Elude Us.
Oxford 2007.
Id.: “Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution: Kant and Basedow on the Need to
Transform Education”, in: Roth, Klas / Surprenant, Chris W. (eds.): Kant and Edu-
cation, pp. 39–54.
Id.: “Cosmopolitical Unity: The Final Destiny of the Human Species”, in: Cohen, Alix
(ed.): Kantis Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Cambridge 2014, pp. 211–
229.
McCarthy, Vincent: Quest for a Philosophical Jesus. Christianity and Philosophy in
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Schelling. Macon 1986.
Mendelssohn, Moses: Jerusalem oder über die religiöse Macht und Judentum. Bielefeld
2001.
Moran,KateA.: Community andProgress inKantosMoral Philosophy.Washington 2012.
Munzel, Felicitas G.: Kantos Conception of Moral Character. The “Critical” Link of
Morality, Anthropology, and reflective Judgment. Chicago – London 1999.
Id.: Kantos Conception of Pedagogy. Toward Education for Freedom. Evanston – Illinois
2012.
Nüchtern, Michael: Article “Apologetics”, in: Betz, Hans Dieter / Browning, Don S. /
Janowski, Bernd / Jüngel, Eberhard (eds.):Religion Past and Present. Encyclopedia of
Theology and Religion. Leiden 2007.
OpConnell, Eoin: “Happiness Proportioned to Virtue: Kant and the Highest Good”, in:
Kantian Review (17) 2012, pp. 257–79.
Pasternack, Lawrence: “The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest
Good, The Practical Postulates and The Fact of Reason”, in:Kant-Studien (102) 2011,
pp. 290–315.
Printy, Michael: “The Determination of Man: Johann Joachim Spalding and the Prot-
estant Enlightenment”, in: Journal of the History of Ideas (74) 2013, pp. 189–212.
Rohden, Valrio et al. (eds.): Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X.
InternationalenKant-Kongresses. Band 4: SektionenV–VII. Berlin –NewYork 2008.
Rossi, Philip J.: The Social Authority of Reason: Kantos Critique, Radical Evil, and the
Destiny of Humankind. Albany 2005.
Id.: “Cosmopolitanism and the Interests of Reason: Hope as Social Framework for
Human Action in History”, in: Rohden et al. (eds.): Recht und Frieden in der Phi-
losophie Kants, pp. 65–75.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: “Of the Social Contract”, in:The Social Contract and other later
political writings. Cambridge 1997, pp. 39–152.
Roth, Klas / Surprenant, Chris (eds.): Kant and Education. Interpretations and Com-
mentary. New York – London 2012.
Sala, Giovanni B.: „Das Reich Gottes auf Erden. Kants Lehre von der Kirche als ,ethi-
schem gemeinen Wesenp“, in: Fischer, Norbert (ed.):Metaphysik, pp. 225–264.
Sommer, Andreas Urs: Sinnstiftung durch Geschichte? Zur Entstehung spekulativ-
universalistischer Geschichtsphilosophie zwischen Bayle und Kant. Basel 2006.
Spalding, Johann Joachim: Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Tübingen 2006.
Stangneth, Bettina: Kultur der Aufrichtigkeit. Zum systematischen Ort von Kants Re-
ligion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. Würzburg 2000.
150
Georg Cavallar
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
Stroud, Scott R.: “Rhetoric and Moral Progress in Kantos Ethical Community”, in:
Philosophy and Rhetoric (38) 2005, pp. 328–354.
Id.: “Ritual and Performative Force in Kantos Ethical Community”, in: Rohden et al.
(eds.): Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, vol. 4, pp. 143–155.
Wimmer, Franz Martin: Interkulturelle Philosophie. Eine Einführung. Wien 2004.
Wimmer, Reiner: Kants kritische Religionsphilosophie. Berlin – New York 1990.
Winter, Aloysius: Der andere Kant. Zur philosophischen Theologie Immanuel Kants.
Hildesheim – Zürich – New York 2000.
Wood, Allen W.: Kantos Moral Religion. Ithaca – London 1970.
Id.: Kantian Ethics. Cambridge 2008.
Id.: “Ethical Community, Church and Scripture”, in: Höffe (ed.): Religion, pp. 131–150.
151
Between Cosmopolis and Apology
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND
